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ABSTRACT 
A zero day vulnerability is an unknown exploit that divulges security flaws in software before such a flaw is publicly 
reported or announced. But how should a nation react to a zero day?  This question is a concern for most national 
governments, and one that requires a systematic approach for its resolution.  The securities of critical infrastructure 
of nations and states have been severally violated by cybercriminals.  Nation-state espionage and the possible 
disruption and circumvention of the security of critical networks has been on the increase.  Most of these violations 
are possible through detectable operational bypasses, which are rather ignored by security administrators.  One 
common instance of a detectable operational bypass is the non-application of periodic security updates and upgrades 
from software and hardware vendors.  Every software is not necessarily in its final state, and the application of 
periodic updates allow for the patching of vulnerable systems, making them to be secure enough to withstand an 
exploit.  To have control over the security of critical national assets, a nation must be “cyber-ready” through the 
proper management of vulnerabilities and the deployment of the rightful technology in the cyberspace for hunting, 
detecting and preventing cyber-attacks and espionage.  To this effect, this paper discusses the implications of zero day 
exploits and highlights the dangers posed by this cankerworm for an unprepared nation.  The paper also adopts the 
defence-in-depth strategy for national readiness and a foolproof system that enforces the security of critical national 
infrastructure at all levels. 
 
Keywords: exploits, zero day, vulnerability, cyberspace, cyber-warfare 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
The cyberspace of nations and states across the globe 
has witnessed a plethora of cyber incidents in recent 
times.  Espionage and cyber warfare are becoming 
more prevalent as the security posture of nations and 
states is continuously being tested.  The quest for 
supremacy on the cyberspace is gaining momentum as 
new attack vectors evolve.  Stuxnet, ramnit, 
polymorphic worms, flame, ransomware, and the like, 
are typical examples of threats that trigger numerous 
incidents in the cyberspace. Some of these cyber 
incidents are perpetrated using detectable operational 
bypasses such as the non-application of security 
updates and upgrades.  Software and hardware 
vendors periodically release periodic updates and 
upgrades as a means of making their products 
foolproof.  However, security updates are released only 
for identified vulnerabilities in a software or hardware 
product.  When such vulnerabilities are not detected 
early enough, they can pose serious security concerns 
for any nation.  When no prior information is available 
for certain vulnerability, and such vulnerability is 
exploited by a malicious user, a zero day exploit is 
inevitable. 
In [1], it is asserted that a zero day exploit means zero 
day of awareness and as such so much damage can be 
done.  Similarly,[2] and [3] opined that a zero day 
exploit such as a polymorphic worm has the capacity to 
trigger unpredictable network behaviour over the 
Internet.  According to [4], zero day exploits are threats 
to information assurance.  Furthermore, Li et al in [5] 
asserts that the wild proliferation of zero day exploits 
especially zero day polymorphic worms is an emerging 
threat for the cyberspace. These threats include and are 
not limited to unauthorised access to classified 
contents, theft of digital assets and business 
intelligence, infestation of critical systems with viruses, 
worms, Trojans, rootkits and backdoors as well as 
prevalent system crashes and loss of revenue.  In a 
recent development in Nigeria, it was reported that 
about N127 billion, representing 0.08% of the country’s 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is lost annually to 
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cybercrime.  This is just a case in point as several other 
nations and states are being drained of their respective 
revenues from cybercrimes, some of which are zero 
days. 
Responding to a zero day has posed to be a significant 
task.  Since no known patch or fix is available at the 
time of a zero day exploit, it is pertinent to have an 
efficient security framework that can reduce its impact.  
Having a robust security framework or architecture 
comes with strategic planning that is a product of 
national readiness for any cyber-aware nation.  The 
situation of an unready nation may as well be 
characterised by frequent cyber incidents, which are 
likely to compromise the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of critical national infrastructure.  In 
response to these challenges, this paper proposes an 
approach based on defence-in-depth for limiting the 
impact of zero days to the attack zone.  This 
containment is necessary for protecting critical assets 
and truncating the escalation of the impact of zero days 
to allow for quick recovery by nations and states.  
 
2. THE CYBERSPACE AND NATIONAL CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
The cyberspace is a community of connections in which 
networks interact across distances to allow for the 
sharing of data, information and programs.  The 
seamless nature of the cyberspace has come as a 
blessing and a huge security concern as well.  While 
data and information sharing has enabled the 
expansion of the Internet and digital communications, 
it has also become the stimulant for security breaches 
and diverse cyber incidents over the years.  
Considering the intricate nature of the cyberspace, 
nations and states have in one way or the other been 
involved in enacting laws, regulations and documenting 
policies for controlling the use of the cyberspace, and 
ensuring a possible zero-violation of its digital assets 
and network contents.  However, the challenge is 
expanding on a daily basis.  New applications are being 
developed, and this development comes with more 
security issues.  
New trends in cloud computing provides for easy 
access to data anywhere and anytime.  Nations and 
governments have imbibed this ease of access, and 
many are yet to consider the security implications of 
this shared pool of computing resources. Most affairs of 
government have now been migrated to the 
cyberspace.  E-commerce, e-governance, e-banking, and 
other electronic platforms are gradually replacing the 
traditional manual processes in all spheres.  Migrating 
access to classified data and critical national 
infrastructure to the cyberspace requires a robust 
security architecture.   
The cyberspace serves as a parallel universe of 
computers and digital communications, providing 
access to data and information at very high speeds [5]. 
The question of migrating the transactions and 
operational routines of nations and states to the 
cyberspace is no longer controvertible as the Internet 
has found widespread relevance owing to its virtual 
proximity, availability, ease of access, and flexibility in 
the context of data and information sharing. To this 
effect, [6] shares the view that the heavy reliance of 
critical infrastructures and enterprises on computer 
networks must have concomitant hardened security 
architecture that is measurable and feasible.  This 
hardened security standpoint is aimed at truncating 
intrusions targeted at networks and connected 
computer systems. The development of such a security 
framework should begin with a comprehensive risk 
assessment of the internal and external factors that can 
militate against national security infrastructure.  A 
nation must be able to assess its current state of 
defences, and ensure a periodic review of these 
defensive strategies to allow for the identification and 
documentation of potential threats to its cyberspace. 
Having a comprehensive documentation of the 
potential risks that can plague a nation’s infrastructure 
can begin with a national database of vulnerabilities. 
The National Vulnerabilities Database (NVD) of the 
United States is a clear demonstration of the need to 
assemble databases of security checklists, security 
related software flaws including misconfigurations, 
product names, and impact metrics [7]. Mobile device 
evolution, and the miniaturisation of computing 
devices paved way for new software applications to 
evolve with added security concerns.  Most government 
formations also allow employees to bring their own 
devices to access privileged data and applications, 
raising concerns of the privacy of classified contents.  
The totality of these security issues, have over the 
years, had tremendous impact on the cyberspace 
including the confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
of services over a national infrastructure.   
The cyberspace has become a breeding ground for 
cyber-warfare. The transition from the physical objects 
of communication to the use of electronic means with 
the added advantage of anonymity provides a platform 
for possible cyber-warfare and other cyber-related 
offences.  As discussed in [8],there is a casual 
relationship between the cyberspace and cyber objects.  
This relationship triggers the existence of cyber-spatial 
objects, which are addressable, and as such can be 
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accessed legitimately or otherwise.  Accessing these 
contents without prior authorization is the basis for 
continuous security breaches across the cyberspace.  
Furthermore, Luker in [9] discussed the various 
implications of insecure cyberspace, and proposed 
strategies for reducing the possible debilitating effect 
of threats in the cyberspace, mentioning that the 
challenge of a secure cyberspace is based on a 
concerted, coordinated and focused effort from all 
levels of government, including the private sector and 
individuals.   
Cyber-systems support most national critical 
infrastructures across the globe [10]. The security of 
these infrastructures including the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of digital assets owned by the 
government, organisations, institutions, and 
individuals depends on the strategies deployed by 
nations and governments to protect the cyberspace.  
The enactment and adherence to regulations and laws 
pertaining to the use of the cyberspace can as well 
leverage the severity of cyber incidents.  The computer 
misuse act of the United Kingdom in [11], the 
regulation of investigatory powers act in [12], the 
computer fraud and abuse act in [13], as well as the 
Nigeria Cybercrimes Act in [14], are documented 
regulations in the public domain that detail the 
acceptable standards for using and distributing 
computing resources, and the penalties associated with 
them.  These regulations are necessitated by the 
controlled use of the cyberspace, and subsequent 
protection of critical national infrastructure.  
A critical look at the conceptual view of the cyberspace, 
as shown in Figure 1, shows that the interdependency 
of the various components constituting the physical, 
logical and information layers including the users 
represent a seamless interaction that requires a robust 
security standpoint to mitigate the proliferation of 
cyber threats in recent times.  Since every user that is 
connected to the cyberspace can in one way or the 
other influence the “health” of cyber systems, which 
may or may not support the interactions within critical 
infrastructure, being proactive in proffering solutions 
to the ravaging effect of the erratic nature of the 
cyberspace is key to degrading the effect of zero day 
exploits.  
Figure 1 depicts the interactions between the various 
components of the cyberspace at a high level of 
abstraction.  The users, who actually define the nature 
and structure of the cyberspace, also influence its usage 
and popularity.  Access to digital assets, including the 
possible abuse of these assets, services rendered and 
the technology driving the communication 
infrastructure on which all connections originate and 
terminate depend on the human factor.  Technology 
driven solutions to the security of cyberspace can also 
be compromised by the human factor.  Consequently, 
enforcing a secure cyberspace must be based on a 
multi-level security architecture that is 
computationally expensive to circumvent while 
restraining possible impacts of zero days to the attack 
zone.  
 
3. EXPLOITING THE THREE DIMENSIONS OF THE 
CYBERSPACE 
The components of the cyberspace can be considered in 
three dimensions.  One dimension of the cyberspace is 
in relation to the network of computers that form the 
basis for interconnectivity between people.  This 
interconnectivity has the goal of information sharing 
through the cyberspace and has also been the tool for 
the spread of all categories of malware.  Viruses, 
worms, Trojans, rootkits, backdoors and ransomware 
are propagated and escalated through the 
interconnectivity of the network of computers 
including the sharing of information through methods 
such as the use of pen drives. 
 
Figure 1: A conceptual view of the cyberspace 
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Figure 2 :Denial of Service attack caused by Code Red (CRv2) [18] 
 
The impact of a zero day exploit that is used to hijack a 
network of computers can have fatal consequences on 
the lives of the people being linked through the 
network.  The disclosure of classified data and 
programs such as the Panama Papers [15], in which a 
zero-day flaw in Drupal content management system is 
now being said to be responsible for hackers 
penetrating the network of the law firm Mossack 
Fonseca to extract more than 11.5 million files, 
culminating in the theft of about 2.6 terabytes of data, 
and further modification or distortion of the data and 
programs against a nation will have even more drastic 
effect on the economy of such a nation.  
Computers that are connected through a network 
depend on the processes and actions initiated by 
people to establish a contents-base, populated with all 
classes of information, which can be accessible by 
anyone with an Internet-enabled device from 
anywhere in the globe.  However, this information 
resides on machines such as servers, laptops, personal 
computers, and smartphones.   
The machines, which are basically manipulated by 
people constitute the second dimension of the 
cyberspace.  In a typical attack scenario, machines are 
pivotal to the success of an attack including a zero day 
exploit.  A vulnerability exploited by an attacker can be 
used to hijack a machine to the extent of using it as a 
pivot for illegally penetrating and maintaining access to 
other machines.  In a Distributed Denial of Service 
(DDoS) attack, a malicious user can make use of 
computers of other users (usually vulnerable hosts in a 
network) to stage an attack against another computer 
or network.  These vulnerable hosts can be discovered 
through the extensive scanning of networks.  Resources 
such as bandwidth, memory, computing power and 
operating system data structures can be affected by a 
DDoS attack. Three of the scanning techniques that can 
be used as stated in [16] are discussed as follows: 
 
3.1 Random scanning 
This involves the random probing of the IP address 
space by an infected machine, which may be the 
attacker’s machine or a collaborating machine (usually 
called a zombie) to discover and infect vulnerable 
machines.  In this way, the infected machine spreads its 
malicious code, completely taking control of other 
machines and causing them to spread the malicious 
code to other vulnerable machines [17].  Code Red 
(CRv2) worm is an example of a malware that spreads 
through random scanning. As shown in Figure 2, it is 
possible for the Code Red exploit to permeate HTTP’s 
default port (TCP port 80) even with a corporate 
firewall installed.  The firewall will have no protection 
against this exploit since most firewalls can allow HTTP 
traffic through.  An IDS (intrusion detection system) 
can trigger an alert indicating the presence of a code 
red exploit. 
 
3.2 Hit-list scanning 
In this technique, a pre-acquired list of IP addresses of 
machines that may be vulnerable is used to scan and 
infect matched vulnerable machines.  This trend 
continues to install malicious code on more and more 
vulnerable machines within a short span of time as the 
scan progresses. 
 
3.3 Permutation scanning  
In each machine, there is a pseudorandom list of IP 
addresses acquired through permutation, which can be 
constructed with a 32-bits block cipher using a 
predetermined key.  The infected machine scans at 
random positions in a well-coordinated way such that 
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already infected machines can be easily identified.  In 
this way, the scanning is faster, and performs better for 
a large pool of IP addresses.  Partitioned permutation 
scanning combines the techniques of hit-list and 
permutation scanning respectively, such that whenever 
a compromised host is found, the hit-list is divided into 
two equal parts.  One half of the list is assigned to the 
new target, which proceeds in the same manner to 
infect other machines in the list until all vulnerable 
targets are located and infected. 
The second dimension of the cyberspace, proves to 
have enormous impact on the cyberspace including the 
tendency to initiate cyber-warfare as well as the ability 
to protect the cyberspace from intruders.  All programs 
and data are hosted on machines.  These programs and 
data are prone to vulnerabilities that are exploitable.  A 
search for vulnerabilities based on software flaws 
between January 2010 and October 2016 as contained 
in the National Vulnerability Database of the United 
States with the Common Vulnerability Scoring System 
(CVSS) version 3 returned a total of 38, 956 
vulnerabilities [19].  Although there may be a slight 
drop in the number of vulnerabilities in 2016 as 
compared to 2014 and 2015 respectively, the huge 
number of vulnerabilities poses significant security 
risks to corporate and small scale businesses, 
organisations, institutions, governments of nations, 
industries and companies across the globe.  The 
evidence of the reality of threats to computer 
infrastructure from both internal and external sources 
is an issue that requires adequate measures for 
mitigation.   
Representing these figures using a line graph as shown 
in Figure 3, reveals that there is still much to be done as 
a means of creating highly secure environments for the 
various parties that deliver some applications and 
services over the Internet as well as on local area 
networks. 
The security of machines is largely impacted by the 
severity of vulnerabilities characterizing the programs 
run on these machines.  The CVSS as proposed by the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
of the United States ranks this severity as low, medium 
or high.  Vulnerabilities ranked high are likely to allow 
an intruder to create a botnet (or zombie army), in 
which case, Internet-connected machines are able to 
pass messages to one another through command and 
control (C&C) to the extent of triggering a cyber-
warfare.  Between 2001 and 2016, NIST catalogued and 
ranked a number of vulnerabilities based on CVSS 
severity [20]. 
Botnets, which are a network of compromised 
computers controlled remotely, raise concerns on the 
security posture of critical infrastructure, and may as 
well spell doom for any nation that does not have a 
robust security framework for mitigating cyber threats 
culminating from the exploitation of these 
vulnerabilities. Similarly, an Internet security threat 
report (ISTR) by the Symantec Corporation in 2014 
also showed a significant rise in zero-day 
vulnerabilities in 2013 [21].  The data reveals that 
exploits in the wild were capable of escalating zero-day 
attacks before mitigation can be proffered. It was 
reported that the majority of the annual total of zero-
day vulnerabilities in 2013 exploited Java, a popular 
programming language and platform with an average 
exposure-window of 3.8 days. Subsequently, the users 
were exposed to the zero-day vulnerabilities for 19 
days, leaving room for a lot of attacks to be successfully 
carried out. 
The third dimension of the cyberspace that can pose a 
major security risk to critical national infrastructure is 
the totality of objects such as sources of information.  
Information sources such as websites, blogs, personal 
pages and accounts, emails, and a plethora of others 
can equip the attacker with the rightful details to 
circumvent the security of critical infrastructure.  To 
this end, sensitive information posted online either 
intentionally or otherwise should be scrutinised for 
possible absence of security details.  A conceptual 
model of the three dimensions of the cyberspace is 
depicted in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 3: Line graph showing the number of catalogued 
vulnerabilities based on software flaws between 2010 
and 2016 as reported by NIST. 
 
Figure 4:  A conceptual model of the three dimensions 
of the cyberspace 
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In Figure 4, D1represents the network of computers 
that link people across the globe to enhance 
information sharing; D2 represents the machines that 
house the programs and data being accessed, 
manipulated and processed such as servers, personal 
computers, laptops, personal digital assistants (PDAs), 
smart phones; and D3 depicts the sources of 
information such as websites, blogs, email accounts and 
so on. If therefore, every component of the 
dimensionality of the cyberspace is exploitable, it is 
important to be cyber-aware through national 
readiness in order to hunt, detect, mitigate and 
truncate zero day exploits on a nation-state cyberspace. 
 
4. CYBER-WARFARE AND NATIONAL READINESS  
The expansion on the dependence of nations on 
computer networks and software, owing to the high 
rate of industrialization and automation, creates an 
environment of seamless connectivity between nations 
and states.  Content sharing in the cyberspace also 
considers the sharing of malicious contents.  It is a 
possibility, in today’s information era, to have conflict 
between nations being escalated through the 
cyberspace.  Some examples of these include: 
i) Russia-Estonia distributed denial of service 
(DDoS) attacks [22]. 
ii) The use of botnets during the Russia-Georgia war 
of 2008; Iran Stuxnet worm attack in 2010 [23]. 
iii) Night dragon targeted attacks on energy 
companies resulting in the theft of sensitive 
intellectual property [24]. 
iv) WannaCry and Petya ransomware attacks on 
high-profile targets in Europe, Asia and America 
[25 – 27]. 
The stuxnet worm is reported to have been 
instrumental to several security breaches that have 
degraded the functionality of critical national 
infrastructure [28].  Cyber-warfare may result from 
provocation, the sheer intent to perpetrate a criminal 
activity and/or the demonstration of cyber power by 
individual hackers, hacktivist groups, corrupt 
businesses, terrorists or nation.  In each case, an attack 
on a computer system or network is staged in a bid to 
take advantage of vulnerable computer systems and 
software in order to propagate information theft, illegal 
financial gains, information distortion, or sheer 
sabotage. 
Cyber-warfare does not rely on the physical distances 
between targets, and as such depends on the attacker’s 
or defender’s ability to have control over the other’s 
cyberspace.  As discussed in [29], the tools and 
techniques required to start a cyber-warfare can be 
available to both the attacker and the defender, and 
requires no forced entry [30].  One of such tools is 
strongly connected to zero-day vulnerabilities and a 
prolonged window of exposure for which patches of 
vulnerabilities are released, made public and installed.  
This implies that the attacker can also be the defender 
and vice versa.  Based on this provision, each 
nation/state must have the security architecture 
necessary to protect the area of cyberspace that 
controls cyber systems, which support critical national 
infrastructure.   The cyberspace is an enabling and 
virtual environment for cyber power.  In other words, 
exerting influence on the cyber systems of nation-state 
can be made possible through the capacity to exploit 
the cyberspace of others to one’s advantage [10]. This 
exploitation has already begun, and fast becoming a 
fifth domain in warfare outside the conventional 
domains of land, sea, air and the outer space.   
The composition of the critical infrastructure of nations 
and states cut across all sectors including 
telecommunication, energy, food, water, emergency 
services, banking finance, and many more.  These 
sectors interact through various means of 
communication, major of which is the cyberspace.  In a 
real sense, the successful hijack of a nation-state 
cyberspace clearly interprets to the defeat of such a 
nation in cyber-warfare.  This probable defeat can 
trigger a chain reaction that will include but not limited 
to the obliteration of financial systems, loss of trust 
from investors and onward economic misfortunes such 
as recession, stagnation and strangulation of economic 
policies, national technology system failures and 
crashes, data leaks, and loss of profits.  However, 
enforcing a national readiness strategy through 
defence-in-depth may likely serve as a panacea for 
controlled access and isolation of the impact zone in 
the event of a zero-day [31], [32].  This helps to ensure 
that the failure of a single control does not result to 
total system compromise. 
 
4.1 National Readiness through Defence-In-Depth 
The defence-in-depth strategy delivers security at 
different levels of protection and implementation as 
discussed in [33], [34], and [35].Preparing for zero-day 
exploits and possible cyber-warfare requires a strategic 
plan, which must be implemented at different phases of 
the security architecture of every nation-state that is 
keen on a secure cyberspace.  Different levels of 
security as shown in Figure 5implies protection at 
different layers.  When security is delivered at different 
interacting layers of a nation’s security standpoint, it is 
possible to isolate a certain layer of impact in the event 
of an exploit and truncate the escalation of an attack in 
real time [36].   
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Figure 5: National readiness through defence-in-depth strategy 
 
As depicted in Figure5, security should start at Level 7 
with awareness through policies and procedures.  
Government legislation should accommodate more 
inclusive policies that comprise of frequent awareness 
programmes for all levels of individuals, groups, 
organisations, parastatals, institutions and government 
agencies.  Procedures for the initiation and 
enforcement of cyber security policies should be based 
on the collaboration of the private and public sectors.  
All documentations and regulations for strategising the 
defence of the cyberspace should be accessible and 
made available to all stakeholders of the public and 
private sectors, with instructions to extend the 
awareness to all those involved in governmental and 
non-governmental affairs. 
Level 6 includes the physical security component of 
defence-in-depth.  This physical security component 
comprises the use of closed circuit television (CCTV), 
locks, personal identity verification credentials, 
biometrics, disaster recovery and continuity of 
operations plan, and security personnel. The physical 
security should be instituted in every environment 
housing critical national infrastructure.  This security 
standpoint at the physical level should be able to 
protect computer servers, hard and tape drives, 
network switches and routers, power grid, and cooling 
systems.  It is pertinent to note that the data targeted 
by an attacker is stored on the tangible aspects of 
computing, and the protection of these tangible devices 
and equipment is essential for enhancing a well-formed 
defence-in-depth strategy. 
At Level 5, the perimeter (network layer) is composed 
of boundary routers, network intrusion detection and 
prevention systems (Network IDPS), firewalls, virtual 
private networks (VPNs), proxy servers, gateway 
antivirus system, and remote authentication dial-in 
user service (RADIUS).  These components help to 
establish connection from an information technology 
(IT) infrastructure to another one, possibly external 
partners, users or the Internet.  The components 
should have hardened security configurations to 
withstand external influences such as attempts at 
attacks and possible attacks on the internal critical 
infrastructure. 
At Level 4, the internal wired or wireless network 
requires server antivirus systems, network-level 
authentication, encryption schemes, network access 
protection, firewalls, time-based passwords and tokens, 
port security, MAC address filtering, use of static IPs, 
virtual local area networks (VLANs), departmental 
security policies, and risk management plans. 
At the host layer (Level 3), several strategies can be 
deployed to enforce a robust security posture.  Some of 
these include the use of host-based intrusion detection 
and prevention systems (IDPS), server antivirus, 
antispyware and certificates, patch management plans, 
host-based antivirus and antispyware systems, data 
encryption schemes, and time-based passwords and 
tokens. 
Level 2 is significantly the software or application 
layer. In this layer, database security, input validation 
schemes, web service security, data encryption 
schemes, application proxies and identity management 
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schemes must be robust to achieve a formidable 
security architecture.   
The innermost layer, which is at Level 1 constituents 
the personal or user layer.  This layer contains a large 
collection of users that have direct contact with the 
data being stored and transmitted.  Since data, 
including files, documents, databases, and 
configuration settings, is the primary target of the 
attacker, and this layer provides the basis for 
comprehensively protecting data from all degrees of 
security breaches, it is necessary to ensure that it is 
computationally infeasible for an attacker to penetrate 
the cyber systems of critical national infrastructure to 
the extent of having illegal access to data or the control 
of it in any form possible.  Security components at this 
point should include the use of authentication and 
authorization mechanisms, security clearances, private 
key infrastructure, role and rule-based authentication, 
dual-factor authentication, biometric authentication 
such as the use of fingerprint, palm, and iris 
authentication as well as data encryption schemes. 
Let us depict national readiness for cyber-warfare as 
some variable NR, and the layers of defence-in-depth as 
Li; with i defined as (1     ), then we can define NR 
as follows: 
      (    )  
Considering this definition, it follows that there is a 
component-wise relation between the different layers 
of the defence-in-depth strategy such that every layer is 
defined reductively in terms of the other, with the outer 
layers ringed around the inner layers in a logical 
hierarchy.  Since these multiple and overlapping layers 
are logically defined, it means there is the tendency to 
define them recursively with respect to the outermost 
layer.  This forms a strong security outpost that can be 
sufficiently useful for the security of nation-state cyber 




The cyberspace of nations and states is supported by 
cyber systems, which are constantly being threatened 
by zero days and cyber-warfare.  The current trend of 
attacks makes it possible to direct thousands of 
malicious payloads towards critical infrastructure, 
thereby causing unprecedented disruption of services, 
data leaks, theft of digital assets, and possible 
modification of execution codes and process controls.  
Stuxnet, DDoS, botnets, Night dragon, Aurora, 
WannaCry, Petya and several flavours of advanced 
persistent threats (APTs) have been used against 
nation-state infrastructure.  The success of these 
attacks have been largely due to the exploitation of 
vulnerabilities in software and hardware systems.  
Although there may be several mitigations against 
these exploits, the impact, sometimes, is hard to 
contain due to the poor security architecture of most 
national and state governments. 
Protecting a nation’s cyberspace can be effected in 
several ways.  However, the capacity to isolate a 
cyberattack is based on the extent to which the 
possibility of the attack is reduced drastically through 
several layers of defences.  Developing a security 
posture that makes it computationally infeasible for an 
attack to succeed in real time should be a consideration 
by every nation-state.  Defence-in-depth, with multiple 
layers of security has the provision to allow for 
incremental security defences that can withstand 
malicious attacks through threat modeling, continuous 
risk analysis, early detection and isolation of the impact 
zone, the implementation of the defence-in-depth 
strategy as well the monitoring and reviewing of the 
existing security infrastructure, and creating room for 
improvements.   
The layered structure of defence-in-depth shows that 
the outer security layers must be defeated before 
access can be allowed to the inner layers, and possibly 
to data, which is the core component of every critical 
infrastructure.  The difficulty in establishing this access 
to critical data, constituting the established contents of 
the infrastructure, implies the security instituted is 
robust enough to keep intruders at bay.  When a 
nation-state is able to achieve this feat, it becomes the 
beginning of more secure cyber systems that are able 
to support a safer cyberspace, and enhance the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of digital 
assets across various critical infrastructure. 
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